[Viral zoonoses in Germany: a One Health perspective]. / Virale Zoonosen in Deutschland aus der One Health-Perspektive.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the increasing occurrence of monkeypox (mpox) diseases outside Africa have illustrated the vulnerability of populations to zoonotic pathogens. In addition, other viral zoonotic pathogens have gained importance in recent years.This review article addresses six notifiable viral zoonotic pathogens as examples to highlight the need for the One Health approach in order to understand the epidemiology of the diseases and to derive recommendations for action by the public health service. The importance of environmental factors, reservoirs, and vectors is emphasized, the diseases in livestock and wildlife are analyzed, and the occurrence and frequency of diseases in the population are described. The pathogens selected here differ in their reservoirs and the role of vectors for transmission, the impact of infections on farm animals, and the disease patterns observed in humans. In addition to zoonotic pathogens that have been known in Germany for a long time or were introduced recently, pathogens whose zoonotic potential has only lately been shown are also considered.For the pathogens discussed here, there are still large knowledge gaps regarding the transmission routes. Future One Health-based studies must contribute to the further elucidation of their transmission routes and the development of prevention measures. The holistic approach does not necessarily include a focus on viral pathogens/diseases, but also includes the question of the interaction of viral, bacterial, and other pathogens, including antibiotic resistance and host microbiomes.

Continuous surveillance and viral discovery in animals and humans are a core component of a one-health approach to address recent viral reverse zoonoses.

Contemporary human and animal viruses have a broad or narrow host range-those with a broad host range are potentially transmitted from animals to humans (ie, zoonosis) or humans to animals (ie, reverse zoonosis). This Currents in One Health article reviews the recent reverse zoonoses involving Coronaviridae, Poxviridae, arboviruses, and, for nonhuman primate species, the human respiratory viruses. The prevention and control of reverse zoonoses are also reviewed. Coronaviruses continue to emerge as new zoonotic agents, including a canine coronavirus, CCoV-HuPn-2018, circulating in people at low levels, and a pangolin coronavirus, MjHKU4r-CoV-1, circulating in Malayan pangolins. Moreover, the risk for SARS-CoV-2 variants to mutate in animal reservoirs and reinfect humans is ongoing. In the case of mpox, the risk of reverse zoonosis is low and there are vaccines for use in humans at risk. The situation with arboviruses is as varied as the number of human arboviruses, and only yellow fever virus and dengue virus have licensed vaccines in the Americas. As for reverse zoonoses in endangered species, solutions require changing human behavior and policies at all levels impacting wildlife. Overall, continuous surveillance and viral discovery in humans and animals remain core components of a one-health approach to reduce and, where possible, eliminate zoonotic and reverse zoonotic diseases. Viral zoonosis and viral reverse zoonosis focusing on recent influenza A virus disease events in humans and other species are the subjects of the companion Currents in One Health by Kibenge, AJVR, June 2023.

New clues to pandemic's origin surface, causing uproar.

Genetic sequences from Wuhan market may point to animal that spread SARS-CoV-2, but data remain hidden.

A Critical Analysis of the Evidence for the SARS-CoV-2 Origin Hypotheses.

When humans experience a new, devastating viral infection such as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), significant challenges arise. How should individuals as well as societies respond to the situation? One of the primary questions concerns the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that infected and was transmitted efficiently among humans, resulting in a pandemic. At first glance, the question appears straightforward to answer. However, the origin of SARS-CoV-2 has been the topic of substantial debate primarily because we do not have access to some relevant data. At least two major hypotheses have been suggested: a natural origin through zoonosis followed by sustained human-to-human spread or the introduction of a natural virus into humans from a laboratory source. Here, we summarize the scientific evidence that informs this debate to provide our fellow scientists and the public with the tools to join the discussion in a constructive and informed manner. Our goal is to dissect the evidence to make it more accessible to those interested in this important problem. The engagement of a broad representation of scientists is critical to ensure that the public and policy-makers can draw on relevant expertise in navigating this controversy.

SARS-CoV-2 infection of companion animals in Egypt and its risk of spillover.

BACKGROUND: Reverse zoonoses occur because of interactions between humans and animals. Homology of ACE-2 cell receptors in different hosts and high mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2 enhance viral transmission among species. OBJECTIVES: This study aimed to investigate spillover of SARS-CoV-2 between humans and companion animals. METHODS: A cross-sectional study was constructed using nasopharyngeal/oropharyngeal swabs, serum and blood samples collected from 66 companion animals (33 cats and 33 dogs) that were in contact with SARS-CoV-2-positive owners from December 2020 to March 2021. Swabs were screened by rRT-PCR and some positive cases were confirmed by partial spike gene sequencing. Clinical pathology and pathological studies were also performed. RESULTS: Our findings revealed that 30% of cats (10/33) and 24% of dogs (8/33) were SARS-CoV-2 positive. While 33% of these animals were asymptomatic (6/18), 28% showed mild respiratory signs (5/18) and 39% displayed severe respiratory signs (7/18) including 4 dead cats 40% (4/10). Partial spike gene sequencing of 6 positive samples collected in December 2020 were identical to SARS-CoV-2 that was detected in humans in Egypt in that time frame. Clinical pathology findings revealed thrombocytopenia, lymphocytopenia, as well as elevated levels of D-dimer, LDH, CRP, and ferritin. Post-mortem and histopathological examinations illustrated multisystemic effects. CONCLUSIONS: There is a potential occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 spillover between humans and pet animals. IMPACTS: The present study highlighted the potential occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 spillover between humans and their companion animals. Biosecurity measures should be applied to decrease spread of SARS-CoV-2 among humans and pet animals.

Close relatives of MERS-CoV in bats use ACE2 as their functional receptors.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and several bat coronaviruses use dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP4) as an entry receptor1-4. However, the receptor for NeoCoV-the closest known MERS-CoV relative found in bats-remains unclear5. Here, using a pseudotype virus entry assay, we found that NeoCoV and its close relative, PDF-2180, can efficiently bind to and use specific bat angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) orthologues and, less favourably, human ACE2 as entry receptors through their receptor-binding domains (RBDs) on the spike (S) proteins. Cryo-electron microscopy analysis revealed an RBD-ACE2 binding interface involving protein-glycan interactions, distinct from those of other known ACE2-using coronaviruses. We identified residues 337-342 of human ACE2 as a molecular determinant restricting NeoCoV entry, whereas a NeoCoV S pseudotyped virus containing a T510F RBD mutation efficiently entered cells expressing human ACE2. Although polyclonal SARS-CoV-2 antibodies or MERS-CoV RBD-specific nanobodies did not cross-neutralize NeoCoV or PDF-2180, an ACE2-specific antibody and two broadly neutralizing betacoronavirus antibodies efficiently inhibited these two pseudotyped viruses. We describe MERS-CoV-related viruses that use ACE2 as an entry receptor, underscoring a promiscuity of receptor use and a potential zoonotic threat.

Wildlife trade is likely the source of SARS-CoV-2.

Multiple transmissions from wildlife at a market in Wuhan probably led to SARS-CoV-2 emergence.

The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan was the early epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Understanding how severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in 2019 is critical to preventing future zoonotic outbreaks before they become the next pandemic. The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, China, was identified as a likely source of cases in early reports, but later this conclusion became controversial. We show here that the earliest known COVID-19 cases from December 2019, including those without reported direct links, were geographically centered on this market. We report that live SARS-CoV-2-susceptible mammals were sold at the market in late 2019 and that within the market, SARS-CoV-2-positive environmental samples were spatially associated with vendors selling live mammals. Although there is insufficient evidence to define upstream events, and exact circumstances remain obscure, our analyses indicate that the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 occurred through the live wildlife trade in China and show that the Huanan market was the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The molecular epidemiology of multiple zoonotic origins of SARS-CoV-2.

Understanding the circumstances that lead to pandemics is important for their prevention. We analyzed the genomic diversity of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) early in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We show that SARS-CoV-2 genomic diversity before February 2020 likely comprised only two distinct viral lineages, denoted "A" and "B." Phylodynamic rooting methods, coupled with epidemic simulations, reveal that these lineages were the result of at least two separate cross-species transmission events into humans. The first zoonotic transmission likely involved lineage B viruses around 18 November 2019 (23 October to 8 December), and the separate introduction of lineage A likely occurred within weeks of this event. These findings indicate that it is unlikely that SARS-CoV-2 circulated widely in humans before November 2019 and define the narrow window between when SARS-CoV-2 first jumped into humans and when the first cases of COVID-19 were reported. As with other coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 emergence likely resulted from multiple zoonotic events.

Transmission history of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and white-tailed deer.

The emergence of a novel pathogen in a susceptible population can cause rapid spread of infection. High prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) has been reported in multiple locations, likely resulting from several human-to-deer spillover events followed by deer-to-deer transmission. Knowledge of the risk and direction of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between humans and potential reservoir hosts is essential for effective disease control and prioritisation of interventions. Using genomic data, we reconstruct the transmission history of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and deer, estimate the case finding rate and attempt to infer relative rates of transmission between species. We found no evidence of direct or indirect transmission from deer to human. However, with an estimated case finding rate of only 4.2%, spillback to humans cannot be ruled out. The extensive transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within deer populations and the large number of unsampled cases highlights the need for active surveillance at the human-animal interface.